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'Dicta Observes
THE N. R. A. ON TRIAL
A moot case involving the N. R. A. and the code was
tried before the Denver Bar Association at its meeting on
March 12th, 1934. Nine members of the Bar were elected to
act as judges.
The case involved one Tom Jones, operator of a retail
store in Denver, for violating several provisions of the retail
code adopted under the authority of the N. R. A. He was
charged with having sold shirts under cost to attract trade
and also with having compelled employees to drop their membership in a labor union and join a company union as a condition of employment. He was tried and convicted and
brought his case to the Supreme Court for review.
The court, by a five-to-four vote, set aside his conviction and held the N. R. A. act unconstitutional.
The brief submitted on behalf of petitioner and against
the constitutionality of the N. R. A. is as follows: Mr.
Harry S. Silverstein presented a brief for the petitioner and
Mr. Philip Hornbein answered on behalf of the United States.
His reply will appear in a subsequent issue of this journal.

TOM JONES VS. UNITED STATES
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
By HARRY S. SILVERSTEIN, ESQ., of the Denver Bar

WE

CONCEDE the pressure of the economic depression to be intolerable to the vast majority of our population. We go full length with the doctrine, announced by the President, that consideration of humanity
transcends all theories of business and of profits. We do not
dispute that an economic emergency exists, not only nationwide, but world-wide in scope, and unprecedented in its effect upon the habits and standards of living of increasingly
larger numbers, to such an extent that the necessity for some
drastic change, or a "New Deal," in business, and even in
governmental regulation is emphatically demanded and obviously indicated.
But when we are pushed beyond these concessions, and
are asked to further grant, almost as a postulate, that admitting the necessity and emergency, the power exists in the
Federal Government to remedy the disease, administer the
nostrum, and regulate the dose, for the whole nation, we cannot go that length.
Granted the urgency of immediate action, that "somebody must do something"-many questions arise. What are
the remedies? Whose duty and obligation is it? Wherein
what source lies the power and the authority to act, to prescribe, to administer, and to regulate.
Neither necessity, nor emergency, is sufficient to change
the essential character of the structure of the Federal Government. So much is conceded, even in the Minnesota Moratorium Case (Home L. V L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 54 Sup. Ct.
231, 235), when Chief Justice Hughes said, "Emergency does
not create power * * * may not call into life a power which

has never lived."
Hence "emergency," dire necessity, and like terms, form
no basis for argument or authority, as to the existence of a
power, but only as to the exercise of a power which already
exists. If the power does exist, it can be constitutionally and
lawfully exercised and called into action, whether conditions
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are normal or emergent. If such power does not in fact exist,
the Supreme Court decisions all declare that no necessities,
expediencies, or emetgency can call it into being. Only by
amendment to the Constitution can such a change be peacefully--only by a revolution can it be forcefully-effected.
Congress has seen fit to act. The National Industrial
Recovery Act was passed. Power to promulgate codes to govern all businesses, retail and wholesale, all agencies engaged in
agriculture and manufacture, marketing and selling. The
terms used in the Act are all embracing, i. e., "trade and industry." There is, however, one limitation, to be presently
noted. These codes, whether framed by the trade or industry, and approved by the President, or prescribed and approved by the President, upon his own motion, are given the
force and effect of law, and any violation of any provision
thereof, is made a crime, a misdemeanor.
The limitation is only that the violation must be "in
any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." As will presently appear this is the gist of the present
controversy, and is the point for decision in the instant case.
In justification of the indictment, trial and conviction
of appellant, counsel for the government assert full power in
Congress to enact the Law, and full legality for the Retail
Code sanctioned thereunder. Let us search the source of their
justification.
It must be found in the language of the Constitution
itself, either in an express and enumerated grant of such
power, or in a power implied to carry into effect an expressly
enumerated grant.
All the prior decisions of this court stress and emphasize
the doctrine, and none now contest it, that "the national government is one of enumerated powers," and that "such powers
embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution, and such as may be implied from those so granted."
Such decisions are compelled by the very language of
the Constitution itself. Even the so-called implied powers in
Congress are expressly limited to the making of "laws to
carry into effect the foregoing powers and all other powers
vested by this Constitution." (Art. I, Sec. 18.)
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Not content with this, and to place forever, as they
thought, outside the reach of Congress to enact laws like the
N. R. A., when the first amendments were adopted, Article X
of those amendments carefully stated:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the People."
We should, perhaps, apologize for calling attention to
these provisions. While, years ago, every school boy knew
them by heart as part of his grade school lessons, yet they seem
to resound upon the halls of Congress as a dead language,
instead of "the Supreme law of the land," and by which every
judge is expressly bound, by the provisions of Sec. 2 of Article VI.
In these days of popular demands upon the Federal Government to take over and unto itself, and to assume, a general and supervising control over crimes and punishments, to
limit production and raise consumption so as to raise prices
of commodities; regulate hours and condition of labor and
wages, and to engage in numerous activities through commissions, bureaus, committees, investigators, licensors, censors,
etc., to such an extent that the alliterative, abbreviative designation of them has long since exhausted the alphabet, and the
letters overlap, just as their administrators, clerks and employees collide with each other and so crowd Washington that
the only persons appreciably benefited by the N. R. A. are the
innkeepers and restaurateurs of the city-in such times, it is
well to hesitate just a moment-to "stop, look and listen" to
words solemnly spoken by this Court during the previous 150
years when we were laboring under what now appears to
have been a delusion, that this was a government of constitutional limitations and not one of constitutional expansions.
Hark to the words of Mr. Justice Brewer in So. Carolina
v. U. S. 199 U. S.437, 448; 50 L. Ed. 261,264.
"Two propositions in our constitutional jurisprudence
are no longer debatable. One is that the national government
is one of enumerated powers; and the other, that a power
enumerated and delegated by the Constitution to Congress is
comprehensive and complete, without other limitations than
those found in the Constitution itself.
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"The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its
meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted,
it means now. Being a grant of powers to a government, its
language is general; and, as changes come in social and political life, it embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are
within the scope of the powers in terms conferred. In other
words, while the powers granted do not change, they apply
from generation to generation to all things to which they are
in their nature applicable. This in no manner abridges the
fact of its changeless nature and meaning. Those things which
are within its grants of power, as those grants were understood
when made, are still within them; and those things not within
them remain still excluded."
So. Carolina v. U. S., 50 L. Ed. 261, 264;
199 U. S. 437, 448.
Also Chief Justice Taney, in
Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 383, 426; 15 L.
Ed. 691, 709.
"It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the government, and
reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the
citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form,
it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the
hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the
people of the United States. Any other rule of construction
would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make
it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the
day."
Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426; 15 L.
Ed. 691, 709.
We still further concede, for the sake of this argument,
that reposed within a sovereign State lies the power to legislate prosperity for the People and profits into their pockets.
Government counsel cannot seduce us into controversial argument over the statement that the laborer is worthy of his hire,
that the community at large is vitally interested in securing
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to the greatest number a living wage, and ever-increasing
standards of living, opportunities for education, culture, and
their welfare in general. Whether the Codes under the N. R.
A. are adapted to that end, whether they will produce the
expected results and promote prosperity or whether, on the
contrary, they will retard it and operate in reverse; whether
higher commodity prices really benefit the wage earner, or
are in reality but a camouflage for greater capitalistic profits
and further exploitation of humanity en masse, are all economic questions, upon which only the so-called experts, professors and "Brain Trust" dare to speak with confidence.
Frankly, as to such questions, we confess our equality with
the ordinary man in the street. We doubt their efficacy. We
only know that the experience of history, ancient, modern
and recent, has shown utter failure of the experiments of
governments to control prices and production, by burning
coffee, restricting rubber plantations, or the thirst and drinking habits of a nation. Whether such activities as the slaughter of milk cows and little pigs, the ploughing under of acres
of cotton and wheat, the establishment of quotas for sugar
beets, will somehow have a different result, we cannot even
guess. All we can do is watch with amazement the financial
and economic wizardry which boldly asserts and acts, and
which is able to discover no inconsistency whatever in measures which simultaneously cut down the number of acres to
be cultivated or devoted to the raising of agricultural products, because of the stated reason that there is too much, and
at the same time spending not only millions, but hundreds
of millions, of the public moneys, in reclamation projects
which have the avowed purpose and only the purpose of making available more land for farming, and turning arid acres
into productive competition with already too many such
acres. We watch and will applaud when the rabbit comes out
of the hat.
There are however some, unfortunately only too few,
who still believe in some very old-fashioned and out-of-date
ideas, in no way connected with any New Deal, and of which
the "Brain Trust" probably never heard and would not recognize. Such as, that when income shrinks and debt threatens, it is time to economize and spend less-that you cannot,
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by any legerdemain borrow yourself out of debt, whether an
individual, a city, a state, or a nation. That ordinary habits
of thrift and saving will still see us through a depression.
That it is the business of the government merely to see to it
that the channels of equal opportunity to all are kept open,
not that the government owes us a living. That government
has enough to do to enforce the laws at present existing, and
in plenty, and sufficient, if so enforced, to prevent the greed,
rapacity, peculation and exploitation on the part of the few
and powerful, which has been one of the chief factors in
causing the present catastrophe. "Equal rights to all and special privileges to none" is still worthy as a desideratum in
legitimate government and just as helpful to business as a
Blue Eagle.
As stated, these are questions of expediency, of legislative wisdom, or its opposite, of politics and statesmanship,
not to be here discussed, nor of weight as concerns the decision of this case.
Granted that such powers are vested in a sovereign state,
the query still obtrudes: Does the Federal Government possess those powers? Are they within the terms of the grant?
Even though the several states may have such powerwhich many of them have denied, as has Colorado-does it
follow that such power has been delegated to the national
government--can it be found among those expressly enumerated powers, and found within the Constitution itself?
Ours is a dual form of government. It has no counterpart among the other nations. Again we refer to the language of Mr. Justice Brewer in South Carolina v. U. S.,
supra, where he says:
"We pass, therefore, to the vital question in the case,
and it is one of far-reaching significance. We have in this republic a dual system of government-national and state-each operating within the same territory and upon the same
persons, and yet working without collision, because their
functions are different. There are certain matters over which
the national government has absolute control, and no action
of the state can interfere therewith, and there are others in
which the state is supreme, and in respect to them the national
government is powerless. To preserve the even balance be-
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tween these two governments, and bold each in its separate
sphere, is the peculiar duty of all courts; pre-eminently of
this-a duty oftentimes of great delicacy and difficulty."
So. Carolinav. U. S., 50 L. Ed., p. 264; 199
U. S. 437, 448.
Here then is the question in the case at bar, of great delicacy due to the present stress and strain, but, in our opinion,
not of so great difficulty when a proper perspective is maintained as to the unrestricted powers of the States, and the
limited powers of the National Government.
By what clauses, and by what language in the Constitution itself does or can the Government claim the power?
It cannot be the general welfare clauses. That occurs
only in the Preamble and in the power of taxation. But the
Preamble grants no powers. That clause is not the source of
power. This court has so expressly declared, in so many
words:
"Although that preamble indicates the general purposes
for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the government of the United States,
or on any of its departments. Such powers embrace only those
expressly granted in the body of the Constitution, and such
as may be implied from those so granted. Although, therefore, one of the declared objects of the Constitution was to
secure the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power can be
exerted to that end by the United States, unless, apart from
the preamble, it be found in some express delegation of power,
or in some power to be properly implied therefrom."
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 22;
49 L. Ed. 643, 648.
Likewise without import for such authority is Art. I,
Section 8, which provides that:
"The congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imports and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States."
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This is commonly construed as a specification of the
purpose for which money may be appropriated, and not as a
substantive grant of power.
1 Willoughly, Const. Law (2nd Ed., 1929),
61;
1 Story on the Const. (5th Ed., 1905), 907909; The Federalist, No. 41.
Remains therefore, only the Commerce Clause, as the
only source from which any conceivable power here contended for may arise. This is recognized by the terms of the
N. R. A. itself, which, throughout, refer to matters within
its scope as being such as are "in or affecting interstate commerce.
Are the transactions here involved "in or affecting interstate commerce"? Unless this Court adopts the view that
everything generally, wages, prices, means, manners and
methods of production, hours and conditions of labor, all
affect interstate commerce, then the answer must be "no." If
this is, or is in, or affects, interstate commerce then there are
no limits ,and those words may be stricken from the N. R. A.
and also from the Constitution itself. Because, in a greater or
less degree, everything done, or restricted from being done, in
trade, industry, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, does, in
some way or other have its effect on commerce.
But the language was not so used in the Constitution,
nor has it yet been given that far-reaching expansion. Upon
the contrary.
In the Child Labor Case (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U. S. 251), this court distinctly held that that clause would
not be extended to include any right in congress to prohibit
shipment in interstate commerce of any articles in the manufacture of which the labor of children under 16 years of age
had been employed. That the law aimed to standardize the
ages at which children could be employed. That the commerce clause could not be used to clothe Congress with any
"power as to a purely local matter to which the Federal authority does not extend" (p. 276), and would constitute the
invasion by Congress of a field denied to it. That the result
of such an usurpation of power would be that "all freedom
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of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states
over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system
of government be practically destroyed." That this clause
did not (274) "give it authority to control the states in
their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture"-nor "to give to Congress a general authority to
equalize such (competitive) conditions" (273) i. e., to prevent possible unfair competition.
It likewise held that where the article is manufactured,
and is offered for shipment "and before transportation begins," the productive labor employed is over, and the mere
fact that they were intended for interstate commerce "does
not make their production subject to Federal control under
the commerce power." This rule likewise applies when articles have already been transported in interstate commerce and
have arrived in a state, when regulations or laws concerning
the retail of such goods within the borders of the state are
within the exclusive control of the State. Such was the holding of this court in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; 32 L. Ed.
347, 351.
That case (the Kidd case) pointed out the danger of
a contrary holding in words fraught with present significance:
"A situation more paralyzing to the State governments
and more provocative of conflicts between the general government and the States, and less likely to have been what the
framers intended, it would be difficult to imagine."
Reverting to the Dagenhart case, and as a rule governing
the instant case, the following is quoted:
"In interpreting the constitution it must never be forgotten that the nation is made up of states, to which are intrusted the power of local government. And to them and to
the people, the powers not expressly delegated to the national
government, are reserved. The power of the states to regulate their purely internal affairs by such laws as seem wise to
the local authority is inherent, and has never been surrendered
to the general government. To sustain this statute would not
be, in our judgment, a recognition of the lawful exertion of
congressional authority over interstate commerce, but would
sanction an invasion by the Federal power of the control of a
matter purely local in character, and over which no authority
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has been delegated to congress in conferring the power to
regulate commerce among the states."
To uphold conviction here, the Dagenhart case will have
to be overruled. When Tom Jones sells shirts at any price
he sees fit, or even gives them away, or sees fit to give away
one shirt to every customer who buys another, that transaction is neither interstate commerce, nor affects it in the sense
used when the Constitution was adopted, or since. Whether
Tom Jones decides to employ only union labor, or only nonunion labor, or to employ only men with red hair, or with
blue eyes, or under any other fanciful classification, does not
concern either state or interstate commerce. Unless restricted
by the State of Colorado nobody can control his liberty of
contract, or his property rights, in regard thereto. Not unless
this court is willing to adopt the views announced by Judge
J. D. Moore of a Texas State District Court, handed down
Oct. 12, 1933, in St. of Texas v. St. Oil Co., wherein the N.
R. A. and the Texas Anti-Trust Law came into conflict. This
judge frankly stated that everything affected interstate commerce. With especial reference to the Child Labor case, he
said:
"The things and conditions that are closing down manufacturing plants throughout the United States are obviously
operating to obstruct interstate commerce. And the same applies to filling stations. * * * In my view congress has the
power to correct conditions existing in every state in the
Union that had made it difficult for children and even their
parents to work at all. The nation-wide conditions which
have taken the children and their parents out of the factories
and have put them on the highways as beggars have affected
interstate commerce."
We await with interest to see if the above language is to
be incorporated in a decision of the U. S. Supreme Court giving effect to it.
When bandits loot a bank, or even a citizen, the ability
of one or more individuals to buy goods is stopped, and hence
commerce is affected. When one, or several persons, fail to
pay their bills promptly, commerce is affected. Hence Congress has power to legislate, under the commerce clause, to
make highway or bank robbery a Federal crime, punishable
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by death, and likewise to pass laws for the collection of private debts, or maybe to cancel them all, and give all a fresh
start!
If the Texas judge is right, then the illustration is not
absurd. Otherwise conviction in the case at bar cannot stand.
The matters here involved, conditions of labor, right
and liberty to contract, the right of the owner to sell at retail, in a local store, his own merchandise, at any price he will,
are not subject even to the regulation and control of the Colorado Legislature. Our Supreme Court has ever stood foursquare to uphold the guaranties of these individual liberties,
and to keep them immune from legislative, interference. So
have the courts of most of the States. Only when "a business is affected with a public interest" is this rule relaxed.
And such "public interest" must be real, not fanciful
and not arbitrarily so assumed. Only such a business as is
(a) Carried on under a public grant of privilege imposing a duty of rendering public service to all demanding it,
i. e., railroads, public utilities, etc.
(b) An exceptional occupation wherein the public interest has been recognized from earliest times, i. e., innkeepers, cab-drivers, grist mills.
(c) One which, though not public in its inception, may
be fairly said to have risen to be such, wherein the owner, by
devoting his business to a public use, in effect grants to the
public an interest in such use-such as grain elevators, or
now, coal mining in Colorado.
Not merely because a business is large, or even because
the public is warranted in having a feeling of concern in its
maintenance.
Such is the holding of this court in
Wolff Packing Co. v. Ind'l. Rel. Com'n., 262
U. S. 522, 67 L. Ed. 1103.
Only such public interest justifies even a sovereign State
in regulating hours of labor, conditions and prices.
In all such cases, however, where such regulatory laws
have been upheld, no Act of Congress was involved. They
are cases where the State, in its sovereign capacity, is exercising
inherent and not delegated powers.
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Such are all the cases from Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, down to the recent affirmance on March 5, 1934, of the
New York State law fixing minimum prices for milk, in the
Nebbia case. None involve any attempts by Congress, in
strictly local affairs, to regulate hours or wages or to fix prices
of commodities, outside the realm of interstate commerce.
Nevertheless, this court has denied even to a state, in a
business not "clothed with a public interest," any power to
infringe upon or to regulate the right of employer and employee to contract with respect to wages. "This is part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the guaranty of the
due process clause of the 14th amendment."
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Ind'l. Rel. of
Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 534; 67 L. Ed.
1103, 1109,
affirming the same doctrine announced in the minimum wage
law case in
Adkins v. Ch. Hospital, 261 U. S.525, 545;
67 L. Ed. 788, 791.
In the last case an Act of Congress, acting as a state
legislative body for the District of Columbia, was held to be
violative of such constitutional guaranties.
In Coppage v. U. S., 236 U. S. 14, 59 L. Ed.
446,
quoted in the Adkins case, Mr. Justice Pitney said:
"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right
of private property-partaking of the nature of each-is the
right to make contracts for the acquisition of property." * * *
If this right be struck down, or arbitrarily interfered with,
there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long established constitutional sense."
Here, in Colorado, our Supreme Court has spoken in
no uncertain terms of and concerning tendencies on the part
of the State Legislature to indulge in paternalistic measures,
and in holding unconstitutional the act of 1899 regulating
hours of employment in underground mines and in smelting
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and ore reduction works. That court, en banc, and without
dissent, speaking through Mr. Justice Campbell said:
"If the theory is correct, the state would be justified in
prescribing the most minute details for the regulation of the
personalconduct of individual citizens, as to things in nowise
affecting the great public interests. Whenever a man fails in
business, or loses a fortune by some great calamity, or
droughtsor floods destroy his crops, the legislaturecould levy
a tax, or make an appropriation,and therefrom establish him
in business, or make good the loss. The practical application
of the theory would destroy the fundamental principles upon
which our government is founded."
In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 429.
In 70 Colo. 90, People v. Western Union, the "AntiCoercion Act" was held void, as in violation both of our Bill
of Rights and the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. That act attempted, just as the N. R. A. and the Retail
Code, to make it a crime for any employer to require an employee to sever his connection with a labor union as a condition of employment.
Akin to regulating prices, our Colorado Court denied
constitutionality to an ordinance forbidding the giving away
of trading stamps, redeemable in merchandise, to purchasers
of other merchandise.
Denver v. Frueauff, 39 Colo. 20.
Even though the U. S. Supreme Court later affirmed the
ruling of the Courts of another state which recognized a similar law as valid, nevertheless our Court stood by its guns and
refused to change its position, in
Denver v. United CigarStores, 68 Colo. 363.
Similarly has the Colorado Court refused to recognize
validity to acts to compel parties to arbitrate disputes (11
Colo 629); to regulate the weighing of coal at mines (21
Colo. 27); to limit a day's work to eight hours (21 Colo.
29) ; to unduly limit the size of bill-boards, and their distance
from buildings (47 Colo. 221); and requiring compulsory
attendance of children to listen to readings from the Bible in
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public schools (81 Colo. 276). These are but a few instances.
Just recently the Court has refused to be influenced by emergent conditions to permit the Legislature to violate plain and
mandatory provisions of our State Constitution in their efforts to raise funds for unemployment relief, while recognizing the crying necessity for such relief as well as the need of
quick action.
We point to these decisions, not only as indicating the
public policy of Colorado, but also as an example, worthy of
emulation even by the highest court in the land, of a steadfast adherence to law and the mandates of the Constitution,
in the face of popular demand and public clamor.
And as to selling shirts at a price too low to suit the
Code, this Court has determined that the price of resale of
theatre tickets cannot be thus fixed, or private property rights
in respect thereto interfered with, in the case of
Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 71 L. Ed.
718.
These decisions demonstrate that the Colorado Legislature could not legally pass, nor the Colorado Courts enforce,
compliance with such Code provisions as our client now
stands branded as a criminal for having violated. And if
this Court should uphold this conviction, and thus hold contrary to the public policy of Colorado, immediately arises the
''paralyzing conflict" mentioned and warned against in the
Kidd case, supra.
The cold logic of this case now compels recognition.
If the sovereign state of Colorado, possessed of and exercising inherent powers, which has every right and power
except only where expressly limited, cannot legally adopt
these Retail Code or N. R. A. provisions, here involved, how
can such power be usurped by the Federal Government, possessing and exercising only expressly granted and limited
powers, under the pretext that they come within the interstate commerce clause?
Can the river run higher than its source? Can the
grantee have greater lands or more power than the grantor?
A recent article by Milton Handler, Assistant Professor
of Law at Columbia University, appeared in the American
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Bar Journal for August, 1933. The writer took a view
strongly in sympathy with the N. I. R. A., and merely pointing out the questions naturally arising thereunder. In concluding his article the author says:
"For the statute in its main aspects to be invalidated
would be little short of a major tragedy. But candor demands
the admission that for the statute and the code to be sustained
in their entirety requires a change of attitude on the part of
the Supreme Court no less revolutionary than the legislation
itself."
But it is no part of the duties of the Supreme Court to
stage revolutions. On the contrary their oaths obligate them
to interpret the Constitution, as it is written-binds them to
it as the supreme law, to defend it against encroachments,
against the demands of popular clamor.
The Constitution was made to operate most powerfully
especially in an emergency. Lacking strain and stress the
structure needs no support. But the Supreme Court stands as
its buttress when storms threaten and it is buffeted and battered by the forces of political expediency and the cries of
distress of a suffering people. In such cases let us recall the
words of caution uttered by Mr. Justice Swayne in the case of
Edward v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. Ed.
793, 797.
He was repeating a similar warning, previously issued
by Chief Justice Taney, in these words:
"Policy and humanity are dangerous guides in the discussion of a legal proposition. He who follows them far is
apt to bring back the means of error and delusion."
This country thus cannot repose in Congress, under our
present Constitution, the power to exercise a broad national
sovereignty. To do so we would have to reconstruct our
entire frame of government, and amend the Constitution. If
we are anxious to cast all our burdens upon the shoulders of
Congress, to look to Washington as the source of all help, let
us do so with our eyes open, after due deliberation of the
whole subject and what it entails, its burdens as well as its
benefits, in various State conventions assembled, and there
amend the ancient document in the only fair way, in the only
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way provided by law for that purpose. Let us have no
amendments or new grants of power by judicial legislation or
interpretation.
If the States are ready then to so surrender their rights
of sovereignty, and if the People are brought to that state that
they are willing to yield their liberties, to surrender their
rights to think and to contract for themselves, to a central
government, and let that government direct and order them
in their daily trade and industry, tell them where and when
and for whom to work, whom to employ, what to sow and
when to reap, what to market and what to destroy, the price
to buy and the price to sell; to turn over also the direction
and control of education, primary and secondary schools, and
colleges; arts, science and agriculture; all in the hope that the
government will also, being thus placed in loco parentis, feed
us, and clothe us and house us, and once in a while let us go
to a movie-if, and when, we are thus ready to confess our
utter inability to manage our own local affairs through our
own states, let us say so frankly and openly, and confess, in
conventions for that purpose duly called and assembled, that
we are hungry, and are willing to trade our priceless birthright of liberty, for which our fathers fought, bled, froze and
died, for a mess of pottage.

THE TWILIGHT OF THE SHERIFF
An extremely interesting article under the above caption appears

in the Saturday Evening Post of the issue of February 17th last. It is
well worth taking a few moments to read and a few moments thereafter
to digest the situation portrayed in the article, particularly in view of
the Dillinger escape from jail in Indiana and the holdup of the bank in
Sioux Falls, with hundreds of spectators looking on.

160

DICTA

NEW BOOKS--SUPREME COURT LAW LIBRARY
The following new publications have been received at the Supreme
Court Law Library:
FEDERAL TRADE REGULATION SERVICE. Published by
Commerce Clearing House. Three volumes, 1934.
This is a loose-leaf service kept up to date by weekly supplements.
It contains the present laws and annotations of the following Acts:
Federal Trade Commission Act, Clayton Anti-Trust Act, Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, Webb Export Trade Associations Act, The Packers
and Stockyards Act of 1921, The Capper-Volstead Act (Agricultural
Associations), Radio Act of 1927, The Cooperative Marketing Act of
1926, Price Fixing under Foreign Banking Act, Grain Futures Act,
Shipping Act, 1916, Anti-Dumping Provisions of Revenue Act of
1916, Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, Tariff Act of
1930, Anti-Injunction Law, The Interstate Commerce Act, The Food
and Drug Act, Emergency Farm Relief Act, Industrial Control (National Recovery) Act, and Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of
1933.
SUPREME COURT LAW. By A. B. Honnold. Published by
West Publishing Co. and the Vernon Law Book Co. Three volumes,
1934.
An encyclopedia of legal principles in the language of, or based
on, the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court.
THE PREPARATION AND PROSECUTION OF PATENT
APPLICATIONS. By Charles W. Rivise. Published by The Michie
Company. One volume, 1933.
THE JUVENILE COURT OF DENVER, COLORADO. A
Digest and Analysis of its Laws and Work. By Judge Stanley H. John-

son. One volume, 1933.

PDictaphun_,
FOUL REPUBLICAN PROPAGANDA
Antonito is the fairest gem of the San Luis Valley, or something.
Proudest boast of the bar thereof is Joe Thomas, Esq. Greatest product
of his facile pen is the New Deal Note. While it is a dastardly thrust
at the policies of the greatest president we have had since March 4, 1933,
it is too good not to print. It reached us through the courtesy of G.
Walter Bowman, Esq., of the Denver Bar, but it would be remiss if
we were to fail to mention that Bentley McMullin, Esq., likewise of
the Denver Bar, called us at 8 o'clock-in the morning!-to inquire if
we were aware of this literary masterpiece. Gents, here it is:

New Deal Note
$------------

Colorado Form
-

19

- --------------

Town

State

Date

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, two years after date,
Unless (1)
The time of payment be extended by law, or,
(2)
The obligation to pay be terminated by act of legislature
(or by executive order), or unless,
(3)
At the time of the maturity hereof the country or locality
be suffering from economic depression, low prices for
produce, drought, cyclone, fire, pestilence, or unless,
(4)
There shall exist some kind of emergency, declared by
act of the legislature, or executive order, to be an emergency,
I, WE, OR EITHER OF US, PROMISE TO PAY TO THE
ORDER OF -------------------------.-.-------

......................----------------------

the sum of-----------------------------------------------------...................
DOLLARS,
Some other form of money be made lawful, either by
Unless (1)
legislative act, or by executive order, and unless,
(2)
A different amount in dollars, or in such other medium
of exchange or currency which shall or may be established by law, or executive order, be made the equivalent
of the sum hereinabove specified.
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WITH INTEREST AT THE RATE OF ------------ PER CENT
PER ANNUM, (Unless some other rate be established by law, or
executive order, or unless interest be so abolished) PAYABLE SEMIANNUALLY (Unless the time of payment be extended or postponed
by law, or by executive order).
The maker, endorsers and guarantors of this note, jointly and
severally agree to and with the payee and his assigns, that:
(1)

They will perform as little labor as possible, working not
to exceed 30 hours per week;
(2)
That they will save nothing, but will, for the purpose of
giving circulation to money (or whatever may be declared
by law to be money), expend promptly all moneys coming into their hands;
(3)
That they and each of them, for the purpose of bringing
back prosperity and promoting recovery, will borrow all
money which shall or may become available for borrowing to them and each of them and that they, and each of
them, will promptly destroy any produce, livestock, hay,
cotton, growing or harvested, which might contribute
toward an overproduction of such article or articles, as government statistics may from time to time indicate, or as we
may be requested to do by the New Deal, the PWA, CWA,
NRA, AAA, or any other agency which may from time
to time be established by law or by executive order.
And we do each and severally hereby agree that if this note be placed
in the hands of an, attorney for collection, or if suit be brought for the
collection hereof, that we and each of us, our sons, relatives and neighbors will promptly hang, or otherwise disable such attorney. It is
hereby agreed that an emergency exists, and that we will not pay this
note if we don't want to do so; and that we don't want to.

Due ..-...
(This form to be used to promote recovery, provide for the circulation of money, and to do away with the old out-of-date methods
of industry, honesty and thrift, and to guard against overproduction
of pigs, etc.)

WILLS--COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES-DECLARATION-BURDEN OF
PROOF-INSTRUCTIONS--Aquilini,

et al. vs. Chamberlin--No.

13065-Decided February 26, 1934--rOpinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
In a will contest judgment went against the contestants. They
seek a reversal of the judgment. The will was admitted to probate upon
the force of a petition that there were no heirs, and notice was given by
publication to unknown heirs. Ten months later the contestants below,
appearing as heirs, petitioned the County Court to set aside the probate
on the ground of lack of capacity to make the will, and undue influence.
The petition was denied and appealed to the District Court. The will
was sustained.
1. An attorney who draws a will and is paid for his services and
also acknowledges as an attesting witness and who participates as an
attorney in the contest of the will merely as an attorney of record and
not as active in conduct of the case, is not disqualified as a witness to
the will. It only affected his credibility and not his competency.
2. A testator, in publishing the will, does not need to declare the
instrument to be his last will and testament in the words of the statute.
If the testator, by word or deed, clearly indicates that the instru-

ment is his last will and testament, it is sufficient.
3. An instruction that a testator is under no legal obligations to
divide his property among his relatives, and that the very right to make
a will implies and presupposes the making of a will and a disposition
of his property in a manner different from that provided by law, isl
proper.
4. An instruction that influence gained by reason of love and
affection, kindness and appeals to feeling is not undue influence, is a
proper instruction where there is evidence to support it.
5. An instruction that the burden of proof rests upon the contestants is proper where the will has oncd been admitted to probate and
such contest is brought after probate.--Judgment affirmed.

AWARD--CHANGE IN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REOPENING
CONDITION-Boulder Valley Coal Co., et al. vs. Shipka, et al.-

No. 13427-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The Industrial Commission awarded to Shipka, claimant, compensation for permanent disability. The District Court affirmed the
award. The claimant received an injury while working for the company
in a coal mine by being caught under falling coal, and filed his claim for
injury but did not include any injury to his back. Hearing was had and
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award made and over a year later further hearing was had and supplemental award made on account of injury to back.
1. Where the evidence supports the Commission's finding of a
changed condition of claimant subsequent to the original award and
there is substantial evidence to sustain a finding that this changed condition was a result of the injury, such award will not be disturbed.--Judgment affirmed.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS--SUFFICIENCY OF ANSWER-DEFECTS UNKNOWN TO TENANT-The

Capitol Amusement Co., et at., vs. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.-No.
13085-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Defendant in error, as landlord, brought suit against plaintiff in
error, as tenant, to recover $6,400.00, ibalance of rent under written
lease. The leased premises were a portion only of a building. A second
amended answer was tendered alleging, among other things, that the
wall, which was a party wall, was negligently constructed and in unsafe
condition and wholly unknown to be so by the tenant at the time the
lease was entered into, and that this wall was no part of the premises
leased by the tenant and that its unsafe condition was either unknown
by the landlord, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have beenr
known, and that on account of its unsafe condition the tenant lost a
sub-tenant, who vacated the premises.
The Court below denied permission to file this second amended
answer and entered judgment against the tenant for the full amount.
1. There is no implied warranty on the part of a lessor that the
premises, as leased, are safe for occupation thereof by the tenant.
2. But there are exceptions to this rule, one being that where the
wall of the building is defective and known to be so by the landlord and
unknown to the tenant at the time of entering into the lease, and if such
condition was not ascertainable by the tenant upon an ordinary or
reasonable inspection of the premises, then it was the duty of the landlord to make such condition known to the tenant and a failure so to
do gives rise to liability on the part of the landlord.
3. Where it appears that the defective wall was no part of the
premises leased to the tenant and that the control of said wall remained
with the landlord, in such case the tenant is under no obligation to inspect the wall. The only obligation, of the tenant is to inspect the
premises covered by the lease. Tenant has the right to assume that the
landlord had properly constructed the wall and was keeping and would
keep same in such condition as to make the premises leased to the tenant
safe for occupancy.
4. The covenant of a tenant to keep the premises in repair does
not extend to such part of the premises as are not under his control.
5. A demise of parcels out of the building leaves the responsibility for what is not demised, upon the landlord. The roof, halls and
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passages not demised, chimneys, eaves and outside walls, remain the
landlord's.
6. The failure of the landlord to discharge the duties imposed
by law, as alleged in the tenant's tendered answer, is sufficient to constitute a defense if proven, and the trial Court was in error in denying
leave to file it on the ground that it did not state a defense.-Judgment
reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY

SUBSEQUENT

TO AWARD-

EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE-Post Printing & Publishing

Co., et al. vs. Erickson, et al.-No. 13409-Decided February
26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Claimant's claim for compensation was affirmed by the District
Court. The claimant was originally awarded compensation for an injury to his right knee. Later, claimant was able to and did return to
work and on the following morning while walking along the sidewalk
on his way to work, but several miles from his place of work, slipped
and fell and broke his right ankle. There was a severe snowstorm at
the time and he was awarded compensation for this latter injury on the
theory that this was a continuation and, practically, a renewal and
aggravation of the injury sustained in the first accident.
1. Any natural development of an industrial injury uninfluenced
by an independent intervening cause, should be attributed to such injury
as part of the loss to be compensated.
2. But upon the happening of a later accident like the one involved here, due to an efficient intervening cause, and not arising out
of or in the course of the employment, the law does not contemplate
that the original compensation shall be increased merely because the
later accident might or would not have happened if the employee had
retained all his former physical powers. It is presumptively for the loss
of these that he was awarded the original compensation.---Judgmrent
reversed.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION -EMPLOYEE

SHOT

BY

ASSAILANT

WHILE WORKING-NOT WITHIN STATUTE-The Rocky Moun-

tain Fuel Co., et at. vs. Kruzic, et al.-No. 13457-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Kruzic, while working for the company, was shot by former employee. There was no evidence that the assault had any connection with
the company. A former employee shot claimant while he was at work
without there being any altercation or any reason whatsoever assigned
in the evidence for the assault. Claimant was allowed compensation by
the Commission and the District Court affirmed the award.
1. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act it is necessary that
the accident originated in a risk peculiar to the employment and that
there was a causal connection between the employer and the accident
or njury.
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2. An accident arises out of an employment when there is a
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.
3. The burden rests on the claimant to establish such facts as
were necessary to a legal award, based upon a causal connection between
the accident and the employment. The basis of such facts must be more
than a mere possibility.
4. The test is whether or not there is a causal connection between
the injury and employment, that is, are they so connected that the injury
naturally resulted from the employment?
5. In this case the injury did not arise out of and in the course
of the employment.-Judgment reversed.

SURETY-LIABILITY OF SURETY ON BOND OF RECEIVER FOR ACTS
DONE AS GENERAL MANAGER-The Fidelity & Guaranty Co. of

New York vs. The People for the Use of Milton D. Green, Special
Receiver-No. 13389-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Judgment was rendered against the surety company below for
$2,500.00 and interest. The surety company had signed George W.
Beck's bond as receiver of the Colorado Pulp and Paper Co. After the
bond was executed the Court appointed receiver as general manager of
the defunct concern.
In said case where the surety company wal not a party this Court
set aside an order of a lower Court of $12,500.00 allowed to Beck as
general manager, but did not set aside the fees of $5,500.00 allowed him
as receiver. He refunded $10,000.00 and this suit was for the balance
of $2,500.00.
1. After the Court had appointed a receiver and ordered him to
give bond in that capacity and after he had taken his oath of office and
after the surety company signed the bond for the faithful performance
of the duties of the receiver, and the Court then creates a new and distinct office of general manager, but no bond in the latter capacity was
either ordered by the Court or given by Beck, such bond as receiver does
not cover Beck's acts as general manager.
2. Where the terms "receiver" and "general manager" are not
used interchangeably in the record but were intended to create two distinct offices, a surety on the bond of the receiver is only liable for the
receiver's acts and is not liable for the acts of the general manager, even
though both offices are held by one person.
3. The liability of the surety is measured by its contract which
was only for the faithful performance of Beck's duties as receiver.Judgmentoreversed.
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PRACTICE-SUPREME COURT-DECISION BY LESS THAN MAJORITY
OF ENTIRE COURT-Dill vs. People-No. 13190-DecidedFeb-

ruary 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
A judgment of conviction in a criminal case was affirmed and motion for rehearing filed and on the day it was denied, defendant moved
that the remittitur be stayed pending further hearing and that the
case be remanded with directions to dismiss the action or for a new trial
on the ground that there are seven justices of this Court, two did not
participate and of the five remaining, two dissented, leaving the majority
opinion supported by only three justices out of the seven.
1. Sec. 7116 of Compiled Laws 1921 which provides that "no
punishment shall be inflicted in any case brought before the Supreme
Court under the provisions of this chapter unless a majority of the justices of said court concur in respect to such punishment" was repealed by
the criminal code which was passed in 1868.-Motion overruled and

remittitur will issue.

APPEAL IN ERROR-APPEAL FROM POLICE MAGISTRATE-TIME TO

FILE BOND AND PAY DOCKET FEE-City of Idaho Springs vs.

Coleman-No. 13185-Decided March 5, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Coleman et al. sought to enjoin the City of Idaho Springs from
enforcing its Police Court judgments against them and to restrain the
enforcement of a penal ordinance and to cancel the appeal bonds in appeal from said judgments to the County Court. Coleman et al. prevailed below.
1. Injunction will not lie against the judicial enforcement of a
penal code. There may be instances when officials may be enjoined from
the arbitrary enforcement of such an ordinance, but such instances are
not those where the interests or rights of the parties have been judicially
determined after a hearing.
2. The city of Idaho Springs had the right to regulate and tax
filling stations by ordinance. This was an occupation tax.
3. Where the defendants in the Police Court failed to prosecute
an appeal, in the manner provided by statute for appeal, they cannot
obtain relief in equity. The first statutory provision for appeal from
police magistrate in cities under 25,000 is that within five days he shall
make sufficient bond, conditioned that he will satisfy such judgment as
may be rendered upon appeal and shall within ten days pay the necessary fee for docketing the case in the County Court. These are mandatory regulations and a failure to comply therewith is fatal to appeal.-

Judgment reversed.

Blakeland Inn
Denver's Newest and
Liveliest Night Spot
Two Miles South of Littleton on Colorado Springs Road

DANCING AND DINING
Featuring

Dave Holloway
and his BLAKELAND INN BAND

GORGEOUS FLOOR SHOW
WITH RAY AND MAXINE
GLADYS WARD
Direct from Harry Richman Club, N. Y., and others
FOR RESERVATIONS PHONE LITTLETON 365-RI

Open All Night
Special Arrangements Can Be Made for Banquets and Dinner Dances

Blakeland Inn

